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Within the United States legal context, the term “diversity” was first 
introduced as a justification for race conscious remedies to racial inequality 
such as affirmative action.  It emanated from Supreme Court Justice 
Powell’s concurring opinion in the 1978 university affirmative action case of 
Regents vs. Bakke.  In that case Bakke, a white applicant to the University 
of California, Davis Medical School, sued the University, alleging his denial 
of admission on racial grounds was a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
because the school reserved 16 spots out of the 100 in any given class for 
“disadvantaged minorities.”  Bakke, when compared to students admitted 
under the special admissions program, had a higher numerical indicia of 
performance, while his race was the only distinguishing characteristic from 
the 16 out of 100 disadvantaged minorities admitted.  (At the same time 
Bakke’s numerical performance was lower than the 84 out of 100 non-
program students admitted).  The Court ruled that although race may be a 
factor in determining admission to public educational institutions, it may 
not be a sole determining factor.  This permitted race to be legally 
considered as a factor amongst many but abolished the use of specific 
numerical quotas in the United States. 
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Justice Powell rejected grounding his analysis in terms of racial 
justice.  He instead used the Federal Constitutional First Amendment free 
speech concept of academic freedom and held that the attainment of a 
diverse student body is a constitutionally acceptable goal for a university to 
achieve (REGENTS V. BAKKE, 1978: 312).  He stated that this was because 
“[t] he Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure 
to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of 
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.  The 
atmosphere of ‘speculation, experiment and creation’—so essential to the 
quality of higher education—is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse 
student body” (REGENTS V. BAKKE, 1978: 312).  Despite the empowering 
nature of his words, Justice Powell’s sole focus on the diversity of ideas 
benefit, undermined the true spirit of any affirmative action policy, which is 
to remedy society's racism and promote racial justice and equality 
(TREVINO, 2002: 451).   
It is thus particularly troubling that diversity has become the 
contemporary dominant defense of affirmative action in the university 
setting, and in doing so has pushed more substantive racial equality 
justifications to the background.  Moreover, “diversity” has been deeply 
critiqued as a paltry conceptual basis for supporting affirmative action.  For 
instance, U.S. Critical Race Theorist Derrick Bell noted that “the concept of 
diversity, far from a viable means of ensuring affirmative action in the 
admissions policies of colleges and graduate schools, is a serious distraction 
in the ongoing efforts to achieve racial justice” (BELL, 2003:1622).  This is 
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because Bell was concerned that “diversity enables courts and policymakers 
to avoid addressing directly the barriers of race and class that adversely 
affect so many applicants” (BELL, 2003:1622).  Similarly, Charles Lawrence 
has cautioned that “diversity cannot be an end in itself--it is substanceless.  
It has no inherent meaning” (LAWRENCE, 1997: 765).  This is because 
“diversity” detached from racial justice can signify any human difference 
unrelated to social inequality. 
The weakness of the current U.S. approach to “diversity” is well 
exemplified by the contemporary Supreme Court affirmative action 
jurisprudence. Indeed, despite the stated constitutionality of the diversity 
rationale for affirmative action, the Supreme Court further narrowed the 
ability of universities to use affirmative action programs in the 2013 case of 
Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.  In Fisher, the Court affirmed the 
process of considering race as a factor amongst others in a public 
university’s admission efforts to achieve a more diverse student body.  But 
the Court went on to specify that the specific admission process of a 
university is nevertheless subject to strict judicial scrutiny in its 
implementation to prove that the program is narrowly tailored to pursuing 
the goal of diversity.  The Fisher decision further diminished the ability to 
effectively pursue integration with race-conscious policies by stating that in 
the judicial assessment of a program the university is not entitled to 
deference or a presumption of good faith in its operation of the program 
because all other non-racial options must be explored before turning to race 
conscious policies.  
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In addition, affirmative action was effectively abolished for the K-12 
setting (primary and secondary schooling) in the 2007 case of Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Meredith v. 
Jefferson County Board of Education.  The case struck down as 
unconstitutional affirmative action programs in Seattle, Washington, and 
Louisville, Kentucky, that used race in assigning K-12 students to public 
schools. The 5 to 4 majority decision held that assigning students only on 
the basis of race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Despite the fact that the Court previously held that racial 
diversity can be a compelling interest for admission to a university, in the 
interest of achieving a diverse and robust exchange of ideas and developing 
leaders from various racial communities, the Court distinguished the 
intellectual diversity needs of a university from the primary and secondary 
school settings.  Recognizing what a thin reed “diversity” has become for 
justifying affirmative action only in limited university settings, Justice 
Stephen Breyer, in his dissent, criticized the majority for jeopardizing the 
progress made regarding racial equality, indicating that “[t]his is a decision 
that the Court and the nation will come to regret.” 
The Court’s most recent affirmative action decision effectively gave all 
states license to issue affirmative action bans themselves.  In the 2014 case 
of Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the Court held that an 
amendment to the Michigan State constitution that bans the use of 
affirmative action at public universities is not a state action that inflicts 
injury on racial minorities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
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United States constitution.  The Court reasoned that there was no authority 
in the U.S. Constitution that would authorize the Court to set aside the 
decision of the Michigan voters to amend its state constitution to ban the 
use of affirmative action at public universities. 
Underlying the conservative majority’s constraints on race-based (but 
noticeably not gender-based) affirmative action, is the premise that even 
“diversity” is now a weak basis for race-based affirmative action.  This 
conservative critique of “diversity” emanates from the notion that race no 
longer has any meaning in our society today.  The passage of civil rights 
laws and the growth of a small middle class of color are viewed as the 
equivalent of a society that has transcended race culminating in the election 
of our first known black president (CHO S., 2009:1589).  From this 
perspective we are in a “post-racial” society where skin-color differences are 
not connected to anything socially or politically salient.  The post-racial view 
also denies that differences in skin color add to the diversity of perspectives 
in a university setting or elsewhere.  In short, the detachment of “diversity” 
from racial justice facilitates the post-racial questioning of what different 
racial groups have to add to the diversity of perspectives in a society.   
This is strikingly evident in the text of the 2014 Supreme Court 
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, opinion on affirmative 
action.  In the Majority decision, Justice Kennedy states “It cannot be 
entertained as a serious proposition that all individuals of the same race 
think alike.”   Justice Scalia similarly disdains drawing connections between 
differences in how one has been treated based upon race and the creation of 
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a diversity of perspectives about social issues.  His concurring opinion 
equates race-conscious affirmative action as a “noxious fiction that, knowing 
only a person’s color or ethnicity, we can be sure that he has a 
predetermined set of policy ‘interests’ thus reinforcing the perception that 
that members of the same racial group-regardless of their age, education, 
economic status share the same political interests.”  While it is certainly 
true that across the globe we have primarily moved away from eugenics-like 
presumptions that particular racial origins preordain our thinking and 
capacities, the notion that there is absolutely no connection between one’s 
racial status in society and how that status differentially influences one’s 
attitudes and opinions flies in the face of a wealth of social science data to 
the contrary (KINDER; WINTER, 2001: 439).  For as philosopher Kwame 
Anthony Appiah notes “the concept of race might be a unicorn, but its horn 
[c]an draw blood” (APPIAH, 2014: 113).  That is to say that while Scalia’s 
critique may echo post-modern challenges to the social construction of 
group differences as “essentialist,” his deconstruction is not accompanied by 
a concern with structural inequality that progressive critiques of 
essentialism contain.  (VERKUYTEN, 2003: 371).  “Essentialism” is the 
presumption that there are intrinsic links between a group difference like 
race and culture.  Scalia’s concern with essentialism is limited to viewing 
the use of group classifications as the sole cause of inequality.    
What then can be done to revitalize “diversity” to better reflect the race 
justice objectives of affirmative action?  Charles Lawrence suggests that 
affirmative action supporters infuse the diversity rationale with meaning by 
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focusing its purpose on anti-racism and anti-subordination with politics 
that promote a commitment to remedying past discrimination, addressing 
present discriminatory practices, and reexamining traditional notions of 
merit in the reproduction of elites (LAWRENCE, 2001: 931-2).  The benefit of 
doing so is borne out by the comparison to India.  Specifically, in Meera 
Deo’s ,comparison of the origins, evolution, and outcomes of affirmative action policies in the U.S. 
with those in India, she found  that an overall difference in justifications has led to divergent 
outcomes in these countries.  “India’s dependence on equality principles as the foundation for 
affirmative action has led to increasing social equality through these programs there, while equality 
has not been achieved and should not be expected in the U.S. where the primary justification for 
affirmative action rests on diversity” [disaggregated from racial equality].  (DEO, 2013: 1). 
 One method for infusing an anti-racism purpose into the diversity 
rationale for affirmative action is to incorporate the emerging insights about 
the operation of implicit bias.  Research in the field of cognitive psychology 
reveals that we all harbor biases (RESKIN, 2005: 33).  Part of the reason for 
enduring social hierarchies is that individuals rely on stereotypes to process 
information, utilizing biases they do not even know they have. These implicit 
biases, as psychologists call them, are picked up over a lifetime, absorbed 
from our culture, and work automatically to color our perceptions and 
influence our choices (LAWRENCE III, 2008: 977).   
 In 1998, the scientific literature introduced an Implicit Association 
Test (IAT) designed to detect the extent of an individual’s implicit biases 
(GREENWALD et al.1998: 1465-66).  Thereafter, a massive study called 
Project Implicit has used a simple online version of the IAT to measure the 
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pervasiveness of implicit social bias 
(https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/iatdetails.html).  The project, housed 
jointly at the University of Virginia, Harvard University and the University of 
Washington, collects 20,000 responses a week—and hundreds of 
researchers are using its data to predict how people will behave based on 
their unconscious prejudices (KRONHOLZ, 2008: W6). The project is funded 
in part by the National Institute of Mental Health and the National Science 
Foundation.  
       Project Implicit’s online IAT studies how quickly individuals “associate 
a group of people, shown in photographs, with either positive or negative 
words.”  The IAT is rooted in the very simple hypothesis that people will find 
it easier to associate pleasant words with faces and names of socially 
favored groups than with socially disfavored group faces and names.  Ease 
of association, measured by judgment speed, is taken as evidence for an 
implicitly-held attitude toward that social group.  Thus for instance, the IAT 
test administrators would say that one has an implicit preference for thin 
people relative to fat people if they are faster to categorize words when Thin 
People and Good share a response key and Fat People and Bad share a 
response key, relative to the reverse.  There are IAT tests that measure 
implicit bias regarding gender, sexuality, religion, Arab-Muslims, disability, 
age, weight, skin-tone, and race.  Once the test is completed, test-takers 
receive ratings like “neutral,” “slight,” “moderate,” or “strong” preference for 
a particular group as a measure of their implicit bias on the subject tested.  
In short, the IAT measures the strength of associations between concepts 
like particular racial groups and positive or negative evaluations or 
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stereotypes about that concept. 
Over a decade of testing in the United States with six million 
participants demonstrates pervasive ongoing bias against non-Whites and 
lingering suspicion of Blacks in particular (KRONHOLZ, 2008: W6).   Some 
75 percent of Whites, Latinos, and Asians show a bias for Whites over 
Blacks (BANAJI & GREENWALD, 2013: 221 n. 6).  In addition, Blacks also show 
a preference for Whites.  Similar results have been found in implicit bias 
testing outside of the United States, such as in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
(http://www.projectimplicit.net/index.html).  Moreover, in a comparison of 
implicit racial attitudes measured by the Implicit Association Test of 
unconscious racial attitudes in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Puerto 
Rico, the study found that all three of the Caribbean nations displayed 
higher rates of implicit bias than in the United States (Peña et al., 2004).   
 In the educational context, studies indicate that teachers generally 
hold different expectations of students from different ethnic origins, and that 
implicit prejudiced attitudes were responsible for these different 
expectations, as well as the ethnic achievement gap in their classrooms  
(VAN DEN BERGH, 2010: 497).  Research shows that teachers who hold 
negative prejudiced attitudes appear more predisposed to evaluate ethnic 
minority students as being less intelligent and having less promising 
prospects for their school careers (Staats & Patton, 2013: 1).  The 
pervasiveness of implicit bias in society and the educational setting strongly 
suggests that the selection of students can be similarly affected by 
unexamined stereotypes and implicit biases.  Bluntly stated, university 
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admission offices and educational institutions are not immune from the 
operation of implicit bias. 
 However, we are not slaves to our implicit associations. Biases can be 
overcome with a concerted effort (BANAJI, 2003: 3).  Remaining alert to the 
existence of bias and recognizing that biases may intrude in an unwanted 
fashion into judgments and actions can help to counter their influence 
(MONTEITH et al., 2010: 183).  Thus, if an individual acknowledges and 
directly challenges his or her biases, as opposed to trying to repress them, it 
is possible to overcome such prejudices (KANG; BANAJI, 2006: 1063).  
Race-conscious affirmative action programs provide educational 
institutions the needed space for acknowledging and addressing implicit 
bias.  Specifically, race-conscious admissions policies give decision makers 
the ability to consider the accomplishments and potential of students in a 
context that tries to neutralize any implicit biases.  In admissions contexts 
primarily based on numerical testing scores, having an affirmative action 
policy can counter the implicit bias that can inform the design of admission 
tests and policies.  This is because when institutionally activated, egalitarian 
goals undermine and inhibit stereotyping (JOLLS & SUNSTEIN, 2006: 969).   
 Furthermore, affirmative action policies also provide the needed sense 
of accountability with the expectation that educational institutions and 
Admission Officers may be called on to justify their aggregate decision 
results to others. Research finds that having a sense of accountability can 
decrease the influence of bias, and encourage decision makers to self-check 
for bias (LERNER; TETLOCK, 1999: 255). Numerous social psychology 
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studies demonstrate that fair-minded people are usually unable to detect 
unfairness in their decision making in the absence of aggregate data 
(CROSBY et al., 2003: 107). Affirmative Action provides the systematic 
aggregate data to ferret out unconscious bias in admissions decisions by 
showing any patterns of exclusion however unintentional.  Furthermore, 
when affirmative action is presented as a system for monitoring bias rather 
than denigrated as a system of granting preferences, public support for the 
policies increases (CROSBY et al., 2003: 93).   
Infusing the notion of “diversity” with the insights from implicit bias 
research would mean that “diversity” could not be so easily undermined as 
the over-simplistic equivalence of racial difference with innate diverse 
perspectives.  Instead, “diversity” would be situated as a method for “de-
biasing” a selection process and monitoring discrimination.  The proposal is 
thus related to but distinct from Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji’s 
suggestion that the law of affirmative action be expanded to conceive of the 
program participants themselves as "de-biasing agents" that help to 
diminish discrimination (KANG; BANAJI, 2006: 1063). The Kang and Banaji 
suggestion is supported by research that demonstrates that exposure to 
racial group members in non-stereotyped positions helps to decrease 
implicit bias routed in stereotyped perspectives. They therefore encourage 
envisioning affirmative action program participants as assisting in the fight 
against racial discrimination rather than as the recipients of a benefit in 
order to reinforce the continuing legality of government-based affirmative 
action as a compelling state interest.  
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 The proposal of this Article for diversity as de-biasing the selection 
process would in a related by distinct manner shift from focusing on 
diversity as yielding a mix of different perspectives or representatives to 
decrease bias, to instead considering the goal of “diversity” as a device for 
making admissions procedures more equitable and justified amidst the 
continuing implicit bias that can be actually measured.  Furthermore, 
connecting the diversity goal as a device for procedurally addressing implicit 
bias in admissions decisions and standards also repositions affirmative 
action as a racial justice project.  Racial justice comes into focus with the 
implicit association research proof that implicit bias is widespread and 
highly predictive of behavior.   With the salience of race thus refortified by 
the implicit association research, “diversity” affirmative action policies can 
be recalibrated to pursue racial equality.        
In short, affirmative action can act as a pair of corrective lenses for 
decision-makers for whom a long history of race-based stereotyping would 
otherwise influence them to unconsciously view applicants of color as 
presumptively less desirable. The corrective lenses of affirmative action do 
not in of themselves grant applicants of color coveted positions - they simply 
permit applicants of color to be seen and thus considered fairly in the first 
place despite the continuing existence of racism in our society.   
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